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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
JOSEPH CURRY, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
 
YELP INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  14-cv-03547-JST    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS FIRST AMENDED CLASS 
ACTION COMPLAINT 
Re: ECF No. 59 
 
This is a securities class action brought against Yelp Inc. (“Yelp”), its co-founder and 
Chief Executive Officer Jeremy Stoppelman, its Chief Financial Officer Robert Krolik, and its 
Chief Operating Officer Geoffrey Donaker (collectively, “Defendants”).  Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendants made material misrepresentations about, among other things, the authenticity of 
reviews hosted on Yelp’s website and whether Yelp manipulated reviews in favor of businesses 
that advertised on Yelp.  Defendants have moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint 
(“FAC”), ECF No. 55, for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  
This matter came for a hearing on November 10, 2015.   
Because the FAC fails to satisfy the requirements for a securities fraud claim, and because 
further leave to amend would be futile, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss without leave to 
amend.   
I. Background 
A. Allegations in the First Amended Complaint 
 Yelp is a company founded in 2004 that “describes itself generally as an online networking 
platform that connects people with great local businesses” by hosting user-generated reviews.  
FAC ¶ 3.  Yelp generates revenue by selling advertising on its website and mobile application.  Id. 
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¶ 4.  Yelp held its Initial Public Offering in March 2012, and its shares are traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange under ticker symbol “YELP.”  Id. ¶ 3. 
 This putative class action is brought on behalf of “all persons who purchased or otherwise 
acquired the common stock of Yelp from October 29, 2013, through April 3, 2014, inclusive,” the 
“Class Period.”  Id. ¶ 1.  Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made false and misleading statements 
regarding Yelp’s advertising practices and financial condition, causing Yelp’s stock to trade at 
“artificially-inflated prices during the Class Period.”  Id. ¶ 7.  
Plaintiffs allege that the misrepresentations began with Yelp’s October 29, 2013 press 
release announcing the company’s financial results for the Third Quarter of 2013, as well as the 
accompanying Prospectus and Registration Statement released on the same day.  Id. ¶ 8.  These 
materials stated that Yelp “saw another quarter of strong momentum thanks to the high-quality, 
authentic content contributed by Yelpers around the world” and that Yelp “contributors provide 
rich, firsthand information about local businesses, such as reviews, ratings and photos.”  Id.  The 
Registration Statement acknowledged that “[t]he media has previously reported allegations that we 
manipulate our reviews, rankings and rating in favor of our advertisers and against non-
advertisers.  These allegations, though untrue, could adversely affect our reputation and brand.”  
Id. ¶ 9.   
Although Defendants disclosed both before and during the Class Period that Yelp actively 
curated and controlled the presentation of reviews on its website, Defendants consistently denied 
manipulating businesses’ reviews in exchange for payment.  Id. ¶¶ 12, 45.  For instance, Yelp 
touted its use of recommendation software to curate reviews in order to ensure the authenticity, 
quality, and integrity of the reviews hosted on its website.  Id. ¶ 33(a), (e).  Vince Sollitto, Yelp’s 
Vice President of Communications and Public Affairs, stated that Yelp employed algorithms as a 
“very aggressive means of filtering out attempts to game the system, fakes and shills.”  Id.  Yelp 
also admitted that it controlled reviews and content through the assistance of “community 
managers” and “scouts” (paid Yelp employees who write reviews of local businesses).  Id. ¶ 33(c), 
(d).  In addition to its use of automated filtering algorithms, Yelp also employed agents who 
 3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
actively “police[d] the site” and manually removed or filtered reviews violating Yelp’s policies.  
Id. ¶ 33(b).  
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ statements regarding the “authentic” and “firsthand” 
nature of its reviews were false and misleading because Defendants “knew, or recklessly 
disregarded and failed to disclose” that “[r]eviews, including anonymous reviews, appearing on 
the Company’s website were not all ‘authentic’ or ‘firsthand.’”  Id. ¶ 49(a).  Plaintiffs allege that 
Yelp “hosted a substantial amount of fraudulent reviews from reviewers Yelp knew did not have 
firsthand experience with the business being reviewed and/or for which Yelp had credible 
evidence that the reviews were false.”  Id.  Despite Yelp’s claims that it used filtering software to 
ensure review authenticity, Plaintiffs allege that fake reviews of non-advertising businesses were 
frequently not screened or removed, in some cases even after businesses contacted Yelp with 
evidence that those reviews were false.  Id.   
Plaintiffs further allege that Yelp’s inclusion of unreliable and inauthentic reviews was in 
some cases not the result of mere oversight, but was Yelp’s calculated business strategy designed 
to shakedown non-advertising businesses for payment.  Id. ¶¶ 49(b), (c).  Thus, Plaintiffs claim 
that Yelp’s statements denying previous allegations that Yelp manipulated its reviews in favor of 
advertisers and against non-advertisers were knowingly false.  Id. ¶ 49(c).  Plaintiffs allege that 
Yelp employees attempted to coerce businesses into buying advertising in exchange for offers to 
remove fake negative reviews and manipulated businesses’ reviews as retribution for refusing to 
buy advertisements.  Id.  Although Yelp maintained that businesses buying advertising were 
merely paying to promote themselves, Plaintiffs allege “that in many instances unless local 
businesses purchased advertising, Yelp would often filter those businesses’ legitimate, authentic, 
first-hand reviews.”  Id. ¶ 49(b).   
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants made false statements in their October 29, 2013 
press release by asserting that Yelp’s raised financial outlook was “due to and a result of the high 
quality and authentic content contributed by Yelpers.”  Id. ¶ 41.  Plaintiffs allege such statements 
were false because Defendants concealed the fact that their growth was in fact due to the 
manipulative advertising tactics alleged in the FAC.  Id. ¶ 49, 61.   
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According to Plaintiffs, on April 2, 2014, The Wall Street Journal (“WSJ”) published an 
article which revealed the truth about Yelp’s manipulation of reviews in favor of advertisers and 
against non-advertisers.   Id. ¶¶ 71–72, 74.  This article disclosed the results of a Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”) request WSJ served on the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
regarding Yelp’s customer complaints.  Id. ¶ 71.  In response to WSJ’s inquiry, the FTC released 
2,046 consumer complaints filed with the FTC against Yelp between 2008 and March 4, 2014.  Id.  
Of the 2,046 consumer complaints, at least 1,344 had not previously been released.  Id. ¶ 74.  
 Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the WSJ article, the market became aware of “new facts 
concerning the volume and the apparent corroborative nature of business owner complaints of 
Yelp’s extortion-like tactics and thus Yelp’s operations and financial condition.”  Id. ¶ 102.  
Plaintiffs claim that the article’s publication caused a decline in Yelp’s stock, which, after closing 
at $80.18 on April 1, 2014, fell to $75.63 by the close of April 2, 2014.  Id. ¶ 103.  On April 3, 
2014, Yelp’s stock price fell further to $70.61, before closing at $65.76 on April 4, 2014.  Id. ¶ 
109.   
Plaintiffs allege that the WSJ article and the underlying FTC complaints were particularly 
damaging to Yelp’s revenue prospects because these materials cast doubt on the veracity of Yelp’s 
denials of its alleged advertising tactics.  Id. ¶ 87(d).  Plaintiffs point to several news reports from 
this period linking the decline in Yelp stock to the WSJ article, including an April 3, 2014 
SunTrust Robinson Humphrey report titled “Yelp Shares Drop On FTC Complaints Disclosure.”  
Id. ¶ 18.  In the FAC, Plaintiffs also include the results from an “Event Study” analysis, which 
they assert “establish[es] that the April 2, 2014 stock price decline was statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level, in turn proving that the decline was caused by the disclosure of the 
April 2, 2014 information and not by chance.”  Id. ¶ 2(b), 88–89.  Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the 
FTC complaints were further damaging because Yelp’s local advertising revenue was “the most 
important part of the company’s business,” representing approximately 82% of Yelp’s annual 
revenue.  Id. ¶ 59.   
 To support an inference of scienter, Plaintiffs plead that “[b]etween November 4, 2013, 
and March 10, 2014, many of [Yelp’s] executive officers and directors,” including Defendants 
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Stoppelman, Krolik, and Donaker, “sold more than 1.1 million shares of their Yelp Class A 
common stock at artificially inflated prices as high as $98.18 per share for insider trading proceeds 
in excess of $81.5 million.”  Id. ¶ 66.  Plaintiffs suggest that these sales show that Defendants and 
other insiders knew that Yelp’s stock was overvalued as a result of the alleged misrepresentations.  
Id. ¶¶ 67–68.  Plaintiffs further allege that the Court should infer scienter against Stoppelman, 
Krolik, and Donaker because of their “positions of control and authority” at Yelp.  Id. ¶¶ 29–31.   
B. Procedural History 
On August 6, 2014, Plaintiff Joseph Curry filed a Complaint for Violations of the Federal 
Securities Laws against Defendants.  ECF No. 1.  Later that month, Plaintiff Mary Adams filed a 
similar complaint against Yelp in a separate action, No. 14-cv-03832, which complaint also 
alleged violations of the federal securities laws and concerned the same class period as the Curry 
action.  On September 22, 2014, the Court ordered the Adams and Curry actions be related.  ECF 
No. 17.   
After the cases were related, two potential lead plaintiffs––an individual named Dru L. Pio 
and the City of Miami Fire Fighters’ and Police Officers’ Retirement Trust (“the Trust”)––filed 
motions asking the Court to consolidate the two cases pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
42(a).  ECF Nos. 19, 21.  Both motions requested that the Court appoint the party who filed the 
respective motion as lead counsel under 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).  Id.   
The Court ordered the actions be consolidated.  ECF No. 30.  The Court appointed the 
Trust as the lead plaintiff because the Trust had alleged the greatest financial stake in the outcome 
of the case, pleading approximately $372,000 in losses due to the decline in Yelp stock, and 
because the Trust had otherwise satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  
ECF Nos. 21 at 5–7.  The Trust subsequently filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint for 
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws (“the initial Complaint”).  ECF No. 33.   
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, contending that Plaintiffs failed to 
adequately plead materially false statements, loss causation, and scienter.  ECF No. 34 at 1–2.  On 
April 21, 2015, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on all three grounds and 
permitted Plaintiffs leave to amend.  ECF No. 48 (“the April 2015 Order”) at 24.  Plaintiffs 
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subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to File a Motion for Reconsideration, which motion the 
Court denied.  ECF Nos. 52, 54.   
On May 21, 2015, Plaintiffs filed the FAC.  ECF No. 55.  On June 26, 2015, Defendants 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the FAC, ECF No. 59, which motion the Court now considers. 
C. Jurisdiction 
 Because this action arises under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.   
II. Legal Standard  
 On a motion to dismiss, courts accept the material facts alleged in the complaint, together 
with reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, as true.  Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 
732 (9th Cir. 2001).  However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true 
is inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory 
statements.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  To be entitled to the presumption of 
truth, a complaint’s claims “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 
notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”  Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 
1216 (9th Cir. 2011).   
 While a plaintiff generally need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007), “[s]ecurities fraud class actions must meet the higher, exacting pleading 
standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(‘PSLRA’).”  Oregon Pub. Employees Ret. Fund v. Apollo Grp. Inc., 774 F.3d 598, 604 (9th Cir. 
2014).  Under the PSLRA, a complaint must “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind” with respect to each alleged 
false statement or omission.  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A).  The PSLRA also provides that “the 
complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why 
the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on 
information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is 
formed.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1)(B). 
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 The Ninth Circuit has held that under the PSLRA, securities fraud plaintiffs must plead all 
the elements of a securities fraud action with particularity.  Oregon Pub. Employees Ret. Fund, 
774 F.3d at 605.  “These requirements present no small hurdle for the securities fraud plaintiff.”  
In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 704 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2012). 
III. Motion to Dismiss 
 Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Securities Exchange Act”) 
prohibits any act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.  To state a claim for violation of section 10(b), a plaintiff must plead with 
particularity: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission made by the defendant; (2) scienter; 
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; 
(4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omissions; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss 
causation.”  Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011) (quoting 
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)).   
 Defendants move to dismiss the FAC with prejudice on the grounds that, like the initial 
Complaint that preceded it, the FAC fails to properly plead the elements of material falsity, loss 
causation, and scienter.   
A. Materially False Statements 
 For a statement or omission to be actionable under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, it must be both (1) false or misleading and (2) material.  A statement or omission is 
false or misleading “if it would give a reasonable investor the impression of a state of affairs that 
differs in a material way from the one that actually exists.”  Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., 
Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); In re 
Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010).  A false or misleading statement or 
omission is material if there is a “substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ 
of information made available.”  TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); 
Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318.  “Although determining materiality in securities fraud cases should 
ordinarily be left to the trier of fact, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are 
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insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”  In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 
F.3d at 1108 (internal and quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made three types of materially false statements.  
FAC ¶ 49. 
i. Statements Touting the “Authentic” and “Firsthand” Nature of 
Reviews Hosted by Yelp 
 First, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants “falsely stated that the reviews on [Yelp’s] website 
were authentic and that the contributors to the website provided high-quality, firsthand 
information about local businesses.”  Id. ¶ 8.  For example, Defendant Stoppelman allegedly 
stated: “We saw another quarter of strong momentum thanks to the high-quality, authentic content 
contributed by Yelpers around the world.”  Id. ¶ 41.  Plaintiffs claim that, in fact, “a substantial 
amount of false” and non-firsthand reviews were hosted on Yelp’s website, as demonstrated by 
consumer complaints submitted to the FTC.  Id. ¶¶ 10, 44, 49(a).   
 In its April 2015 Order, the Court rejected this theory.  ECF No. 48 at 10–11.  The Court 
held that Defendants’ statements were not false or misleading because a reasonable investor would 
not believe that all reviews hosted on Yelp’s website were authentic, especially in light of 
Defendants’ previous acknowledgements that Yelp’s screening technology was imperfect.  Id.; see 
SEC Form S-1 Registration Statement, ECF No. 35-1 at 16 (recognizing that Yelp could not 
“guarantee the effectiveness or adequacy” of its screening mechanisms).  Yelp also implicitly 
acknowledged that at least some inauthentic reviews existed by openly using screening technology 
designed to filter inauthentic reviews.  See FAC ¶¶ 33(a), 62 (“Our recommendation software 
operates continually, and the results of its determinations with respect to particular reviews may 
change over time as it factors in new information.”).  Moreover, because Yelp’s Registration 
Statement acknowledged that Yelp’s screening algorithms were fallible, the Court previously held 
that the fact that Yelp hosted some inauthentic or non-firsthand reviews did not significantly alter 
the “total mix” of information available to the market.  ECF No. 48 at 11.  Thus, the allegedly 
false statements were not material.   
 In the FAC, Plaintiffs attempt to cure these defects by (1) including the text of several 
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additional FTC complaints, which were not cited in the initial Complaint, FAC ¶ 49(a)(xv)–(xix); 
and (2) adding allegations regarding four additional non-FTC complaints which raised similar 
contentions as the FTC complaints previously highlighted by Plaintiffs, FAC ¶ 40.  Plaintiffs 
contend that they do not allege Defendants guaranteed that all reviews were authentic or firsthand, 
but rather that, because “many of the reviews were not authentic and firsthand,” Defendants’ 
statements were false.  ECF No. 62 at 5 (emphasis added).  Defendants counter that the FAC still 
relies “on the release of the complaints identified in the [initial] Complaint without adding a single 
new fact or source.  Nothing shows that those complaints were anything but second-hand and of 
the very type and nature disclosed by Yelp and others long before April 2014.”  ECF No. 59 at 2.   
The Court agrees that the FAC fails to sufficiently allege that these statements were 
materially false.  Adding a handful of additional examples of complaints concerning the allegedly 
inauthentic nature of a small subset of Yelp reviews does not affect the veracity of Defendants’ 
previous statements that Yelp reviews, by and large, are “authentic” and “firsthand,” especially in 
light of Defendants’ previous acknowledgements that Yelp’s screening technology was imperfect.  
See id. at 5 (“the FAC remains based on complaints about a tiny fraction of the tens of millions of 
reviews on Yelp’s sites by a tiny fraction of the tens of millions of businesses listed on the sites”); 
ECF No. 35-1 at 16.  The same logic applies to the four additional non-FTC complaints identified 
in the FAC.  FAC ¶ 40.   
 The Court continues to find persuasive Judge Forrest’s reasoning in In re Lululemon 
Securities Litigation, 14 F. Supp. 3d 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  In In re Lululemon, Judge Forrest held 
that Lululemon’s statements regarding the “high quality” of its products compared to others in the 
industry were not rendered actionably false by the company’s subsequent recall of products that 
were found to have quality issues.
1
  14 F. Supp. 3d at 557.  Judge Forrest reasoned that, even prior 
                                                 
1
 Plaintiffs assert that the reasoning in In re Lululemon is inapposite because (1) In re Lululemon 
involved “non-actionable puffing” and (2) customer complaints, which are “qualitatively 
different” than the FTC complaints at issue here.  ECF No. 62 at 5–6.  The first contention is flatly 
incorrect.  Without mentioning “puffing,” the In re Lululemon court determined that plaintiffs’ 
interpretation of several allegedly false statements was “unreasonable” given defendant’s “clear 
acknowledgements that product defects do occur.”  14 F. Supp. 3d at 577; see also id. at 577 n.15 
(“Though the Court need not reach the issue of materiality in light of the other grounds for 
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to the recall, Lululemon’s website when read in context “implie[d] that such defects occur and 
with enough regularity to have an established policy as to how they are handled . . . .”  Id.  The 
Second Circuit recently affirmed this decision, relying on the fact that “Lululemon disclosed the 
possibility of product quality deficiencies and the potential adverse financial impact of these 
deficiencies, should they arise.”  In re Lululemon Sec. Litig., 604 Fed. App’x 62, 63 n.1 (2d Cir. 
2015).   
 Similarly, here, Defendants both explicitly and implicitly acknowledged that some Yelp 
reviews were inauthentic.  Those acknowledgements, along with a common-sense understanding 
of what it means for a website to host user-generated content, demonstrates that no reasonable 
investor could have understood Defendants’ statements to mean that all Yelp reviews were 
authentic.  See, e.g., ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 15 (stock analyst noting that “there are going to be 
some illegitimate reviews that make it through the safeguards onto [Yelp’s] platform and cause 
problems.  To successfully police 100% of the reviews is likely impossible and we find it very 
difficult to argue that Yelp’s quality controls are somehow deficient.”).  Because a reasonable 
investor would have known that some of the reviews on Yelp’s website were inauthentic, the 
handful of additional complaints that Plaintiffs have added to the FAC claiming that certain Yelp 
reviews are inauthentic does not alter the Court’s previous conclusion that these complaints did 
not significantly alter the “total mix” of information available to the market.  TSC Indus., 426 U.S. 
at 449; Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318.  Thus, these statements were not materially false.   
ii. Statements Denying Manipulation of Reviews in Favor of Advertisers 
and Against Non-Advertisers 
Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ statements denying that Yelp manipulated 
                                                                                                                                                                
dismissal of the CAC described herein, it notes that many of the alleged misstatements, in context, 
are likely also not actionable because they are mere puffery or expressions of corporate 
optimism.”).  Thus, the defendant’s statements were not false or misleading as reasonable 
investors would interpret them.  Id. at 581.  As to the second contention, Plaintiffs have not 
offered any reason why the distinction between the “customer complaints” in In re Lululemon and 
the FTC complaints at issue here should affect the Court’s analysis.  See ECF No. 62 at 6. 
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reviews in favor of advertising businesses and against non-advertising businesses were materially 
false.  Id. ¶ 49(c).  Plaintiffs rely, in part, on a statement made on Yelp’s website that “there is zero 
relationship between the timing of when a review gets recommended and when a business decides 
to—or declines to—advertise.”  Id. ¶¶ 12, 46.  Yelp also stated that “[o]ur recommendation 
software treats advertisers and non-advertisers exactly the same.”  Id. ¶ 46.  According to 
Plaintiffs, the April 2, 2014 WSJ article and the underlying FTC complaints revealed these 
statements to be false, Id. ¶¶ 49(a)–(c), 90, because, in reality, “when local businesses declined 
[Yelp’s] overtures to purchase advertising, [Yelp] would often retaliate by removing or filtering 
their good review and displaying only negative and sometimes fake reviews to encourage non-
advertising local businesses to purchase ads.”  Id. ¶ 44.  Plaintiffs also allege that Yelp would 
“often offer to suppress negative reviews for a fee.”  Id.  
a. Falsity 
In its April 2015 Order, the Court held that the contents of the FTC complaints did not 
establish that Defendants’ statements denying manipulation of Yelp reviews were false.  ECF No. 
48 at 14.  The Court determined that even if consumer complaints could sufficiently prove a 
statement false to overcome a motion to dismiss, the FTC complaints highlighted by the initial 
Complaint did not do so because they were insufficiently numerous and corroborative.  ECF No. 
48 at 14–16; see In re Netflix, Inc. Sec. Litig., C04-2978 FMS, 2005 WL 1562858, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. June 28, 2005) (finding that a small number of customer complaints, on their own, do not 
establish that a company’s contrary statements are false because “every large company can expect 
to have some customer complaints”).  Moreover, many of the customer complaints relied on by 
Plaintiffs hinged on the customers’ inferences of misconduct, rather than concrete examples of 
Yelp’s behavior.  ECF No. 48 at 15.  The Court concluded that these complaints failed to establish 
any significant pattern of misconduct tending to prove that Yelp’s denials of manipulation were 
false. 
In the FAC, Plaintiffs have added nine additional examples of FTC complaints and four 
additional examples of non-FTC complaints, which allegedly support their claim that Yelp’s 
denial of manipulation was false.  FAC ¶ 40; ¶ 49(c)(xviii)–(xx), (xxx)–(xxxv).  Plaintiffs allege 
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that these complaints are corroborative of each other because “many stated that the filtering 
happened immediately” after the complainant’s decision whether or not to pay for advertising with 
Yelp.  Id. ¶ 75 (emphasis in original).  Plaintiffs also assert that the FTC complaints tend to prove 
Defendants’ denials of manipulation false because the number of FTC complaints accelerated by 
“more than 600%” between August 3, 2012 and March 4, 2014.  Id. ¶ 72, 74.  Finally, Plaintiffs 
intimate that because Yelp employees, including community managers, had the technological 
capability to manually filter Yelp reviews, Defendants plausibly had the ability to effectuate the 
alleged advertising scheme, thereby making Defendants’ denials more likely to be false.  Id. ¶ 33.   
 Defendants counter that the FAC merely repackages the same information the Court 
previously rejected as being insufficient to demonstrate falsity.  ECF No. 59 at 8.  Defendants 
assert that changes in the particular reviews that surface on Yelp are not probative of manipulation 
because Yelp has admitted that “whether a review is filtered may change from day to day.”  Id. 
(citing ECF No. 35-7 at 34 (“Our recommendation software operates continually, and the results 
of its determinations with respect to particular reviews may change over time as it factors in new 
information.”)).  Further, Defendants counter Plaintiffs’ assertions regarding the acceleration of 
FTC complaints by noting that the total number of Yelp reviews was correspondingly increasing 
over the same time frame.  Id. at 7.   
 The Court finds Defendants’ arguments more persuasive.  The FAC includes nine new 
examples of FTC complaints alleging manipulation of Yelp reviews, compared to the 25 such FTC 
complaints which the Court previously found “did not establish that Yelp engaged in large-scale 
manipulation of customer reviews.”  ECF No. 48 at 15. The inclusion of these nine new FTC 
complaints does not affect the Court’s previous analysis.  Id. at 15–16.  Once again, some of the 
newly highlighted FTC complaints do not allege that Yelp told the business owner in question that 
purchasing advertising would influence the filtering of reviews.  Instead, these business owners 
drew their own inferences about Yelp’s manipulation of reviews based on what they regarded as 
suspiciously-timed changes in their reviews.  See FAC ¶ 49(c)(xviii) (Yelp “asked if I wanted to 
advertise on their website.  I respectfully declined.  They then immediately started filtering out all 
the positive reviews . . . .”); ¶ 49(c)(xix) (“After making it clear that I don’t want to pay to 
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advertise with [Yelp], they have ‘filtered’ a majority of my reviews.”); ¶49(c)(xx) (After refusing 
to advertise with Yelp, “we started seeing all of our positive reviews . . . disappear and left only 2 
negative reviews . . . just because we refused to pay for [Yelp’s] enhancing ad.”).  While six of the 
nine new FTC complaints do contain allegations that a Yelp representative directly told the 
complainant that Yelp would manipulate reviews in exchange for a fee, see FAC ¶ 49(c)(xxx), 
(xxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv), the FAC now identifies only eleven such FTC complaints 
out of the 2,046 released by the FTC covering a five year period.  See FAC ¶ 49(a)(ii), ¶49(c)(ii), 
(xvi), (xxiv), (xxvi), (xxx), (xxxi), (xxxii), (xxxiii), (xxxiv), (xxxv).
2
   
 As the Court observed its previous order of dismissal, “every large company can expect to 
have some customer complaints.”  Curry v. Yelp Inc., No. 14-CV-03547-JST, 2015 WL 1849037, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2015).  Thus, Plaintiffs must show more than the mere existence of a few 
customer complaints per year to adequately plead that Defendants’ denials of manipulation were 
false or misleading.  See In re Netflix, 2005 WL 1562858, at *7; ECF No. 48 at 13–16.  Especially 
when compared to the tens of millions of reviews hosted by Yelp, a dozen relevant but 
unsubstantiated and divergent consumer complaints over at least five years does not establish a 
pattern of conduct sufficient to indicate that Defendants’ statements were false.  And Plaintiffs 
have again failed to direct the Court to any case holding that customer complaints alleging 
circumstances that are contrary to defendant’s representations independently suffice to establish 
the falsity of those representations.  Because a small number of customer complaints does not 
sufficiently establish the veracity of the allegations contained therein, see In re Netflix, 2005 WL 
1562858, at *7, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead falsity with particularity.
3
 
                                                 
2
 Out of the six non-FTC complaints, only one complaint alleged that a Yelp representative 
directly told the complainant that Yelp would manipulate reviews in exchange for a fee.  See FAC 
¶ 40 (complaint of Gary Hollander).  The other five non-FTC complaints reveal the same 
unsubstantiated inferences that plague most of the FTC complaints cited by Plaintiffs.  See, e.g., 
FAC ¶ 40 (“[A]fter he declined to purchase advertising, Yelp filtered most of his positive reviews, 
but not his negative ones.”). 
3
 For the same reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ statement that “businesses could pay to 
promote themselves” was not false.  FAC ¶ 49(b).  Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ statement that 
“businesses could pay to promote themselves” through targeted advertising was materially false 
because Yelp would filter authentic reviews “unless local businesses purchased advertising.”  FAC 
¶ 49(b).  Plaintiffs appear to argue that Defendants’ statement was misleading because it impliedly 
“create[d] an impression of a state of affairs that differs in a material way from the one that 
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b. Materiality 
 In its April 2015 Order, the Court noted that prior to April 2, 2014, Yelp’s Registration 
Statement acknowledged that “[n]egative publicity could adversely affect our reputation and 
brand,” specifically noting previous media reports of allegations that Yelp “manipulates [] 
reviews, rankings and ratings in favor of our advertisers and against non-advertisers.”  ECF No. 48 
at 12 (quoting ECF No. 35-1 at 16).  Yelp’s Registration Statement also disclosed that “various 
businesses have sued us alleging that we manipulate Yelp reviews in order to coerce them and 
other businesses to pay for Yelp advertising.”  ECF No. 35-1 at 22.4  The Court relied, in part, on 
these statements to conclude that the disclosure of the FTC complaints alleging manipulation was 
not material because it did not alter the “total mix” of information available to the market.  ECF 
No. 48 at 12–13 (citing S.E.C. v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiffs advance 
several arguments why the FAC alleges materiality with respect to Yelp’s denials of manipulation 
of reviews, which arguments the Court now addresses in turn.   
 First, Plaintiffs argue that the content of the FTC complaints must have been new and 
material because, otherwise, Yelp’s stock would not have dropped so significantly the day the 
WSJ article revealed the existence of the FTC complaints.  ECF No. 62 at 9–10, 15–16 
(“Defendants, moreover, fail to explain why if the April 2, 2014 disclosure contained no new 
information, the market reacted the way it did and Yelp’s stock price declined nearly 6% . . . 
following disclosure of the FTC complaints.”).  Plaintiffs support this argument by noting that the 
                                                                                                                                                                
actually exists,” namely that Yelp does not manipulate reviews for advertisers.  Brody v. 
Transitional Hospitals Corp., 280 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002).  The Court doubts whether 
Defendants’ statement created the impression that Yelp did not manipulate reviews in favor of 
advertisers.  Moreover, because a small number of customer complaints alleging that Yelp 
manipulates reviews in favor of advertisers does not establish the veracity of the allegations 
contained therein, see In re Netflix, 2005 WL 1562858, at *7, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have 
failed to plead falsity of this statement with particularity. 
4
 In its April 2015 Order, the Court noted that it “need not resolve the question of whether a ‘truth-
on-the-market’ defense is properly considered at the motion to dismiss stage.  Yelp disclosed the 
existence of persistent allegations that Yelp manipulated reviews in favor of advertisers in its 
Registration Statement.  Because this disclosure existed within the four corners of a statement that 
Plaintiffs allege was false or misleading, the Court need not analyze whether the truth was 
‘transmitted to the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to effectively 
counterbalance any misleading impression created by insider’s one-sided representations.’  
Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1493 (9th Cir. 1996).”  ECF No. 48 at 12–13 n.3. 
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FAC includes the results of an “event study,” which allegedly “demonstrates that the sharp decline 
in [Yelp’s] share price was statistically significant and the direct result of the new information 
contained within The Wall Street Journal’s article.”  Id. at 10 (citing FAC ¶ 89).   
 Defendants challenge the relevance of Plaintiffs’ event study on a number of grounds, 
including that the event study does not establish materiality under the applicable PSLRA 
standard.
5
  ECF No. 63 at 5–6.  In particular, Defendants note that “[t]he WSJ article reports that 
Yelp’s stock price was ‘down 6%’ at the time the article was published.  Therefore, that price 
decline could not possibly have been attributed to the article.”  ECF No. 63 at 6 (emphasis in 
original). 
 The Court agrees with Defendants.  Because the WSJ article, which appears to have been 
published at 4:23 PM ET on April 2, 2014, states that “Yelp was down 6% . . . in Wednesday 
afternoon trading in the wake of the [FTC] disclosure,” ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 7 (emphasis 
added), the WSJ article itself could not have possibly altered the “total mix” of information 
available to the market such that Yelp’s stock declined on April 2, as Plaintiffs appear to argue.  
ECF No. 62 at 10 (“[T]he event study demonstrates that the sharp decline in [Yelp’s] share price 
[on April 2, 2014] was statistically significant and the direct result of the new information 
contained within The Wall Street Journal’s article.”); id. at 15 (“As the FAC alleges, only the 
thousands of corroborative complaints by Yelp reviewers and business owners revealed by The 
Wall Street Journal exposed defendants’ statements as false.”); FAC ¶¶ 90–91 (“[F]ollowing The 
Wall Street Journal article Yelp’s stock price declined 5.7% . . . . [T]his statistically significant 
price decline is uncontroverted evidence that the market viewed the information disclosed in The 
Wall Street Journal article to be new and material.”).  Even if the WSJ article were published prior 
to the stock decline, the WSJ article did not discuss the contents of the FTC complaints.
6
  Instead, 
                                                 
5
 Because the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument regarding the relevance of the event study on 
other grounds, the Court need not address Defendants’ argument that an event study is an opinion, 
as opposed to a fact, and thus cannot be properly considered on a motion to dismiss.  ECF No. 63 
at 5. 
6
 Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the WSJ article “opine[d] on the content and subject matter of the 
FTC complaints.”  ECF No. 62 at 19 (citing ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 7).  In reality, the WSJ article 
revealed nothing regarding the contents of the FTC complaints.  ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 7.  At the 
same time, the WSJ article did discuss a Harvard Business School study, which “concluded that 
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the WSJ article merely reported that on April 2, 2014, the FTC “disclosed on its website that it 
received 2,046 complaints about Yelp from 2008 through March 4 of this year, noting that its 
disclosure was part of a Freedom of Information Act request from the Wall Street Journal.”  ECF 
No. 55-3, Exhibit 7.  Thus, the WSJ article itself did not disclose any information regarding Yelp’s 
manipulation of reviews, which could have been material.
7
 
 Rather, Plaintiffs’ only conceivably plausible materiality argument would be that the 
FTC’s disclosure of the underlying FTC complaints, and not the WSJ article reporting on the 
FTC’s disclosure, altered the “total mix” of information available to the market.  However, the 
FAC fails to allege any information regarding the FTC’s disclosure of the underlying complaints 
from which the Court could assess materiality.  While the WSJ article attached as an exhibit to the 
FAC states that “[o]n Wednesday, the Federal Trade Commission disclosed on its website that it 
received 2,046 complaints about Yelp from 2008 through March 4 of this year,” it is unclear 
whether the FTC disclosed the contents of those complaints.
8
  ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 7.  
                                                                                                                                                                
there was nothing ‘statistically significant’ to support claims that Yelp gives preferential treatment 
to businesses that pay for advertising or other services on the site.”  Id. 
7
 For the same reason, the Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that “[m]ultiple reports by analysts . . . 
further demonstrate that reasonable investors found disclosure of the FTC complaints to constitute 
new information that was important to their investment decisions.”  ECF No. 62 at 11.  Just as the 
WSJ article revealed no information about the contents of the FTC complaints, several of the other 
“analyst reports” cited by Plaintiffs also did not discuss the contents of the FTC complaints.  See, 
e.g., ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 8 (April 2, 2014 The Street article) (“The exact nature of the 
complaints are unknown but in the past local businesses have accused Yelp of hurting their ratings 
by posting only negative reviews about their businesses after they refused to buy ads.”); ECF No. 
55-3, Exhibit 9 (April 3, 2014 SunTrust Robinson Humphrey report) (“The complaints have not 
necessarily been verified by the FTC and we do not know that exact nature or detail of the 
complaints.”); ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 11 (April 3, 2014 MTNewswires article) (Yelp stock “sinks 
for a second session on Thursday as investors scrutinize a Federal Trade Commission disclosure 
this week that revealed 2,046 complaints about the review site from 2008 through March of this 
year.”).  Accordingly, these analyst reports do not support Plaintiffs’ claim that reasonable 
investors in fact relied on the allegations of review manipulation contained in the FTC complaints.  
While one of the analyst reports does discuss the content of some of the 2,046 FTC complaints, 
ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 13 (April 4, 2014 Zacks Equity Research article) (“[M]ost of the 
complaints were lodged by small business owners alleging that Yelp posts fraudulent reviews that 
defame their reputation.”), that report was published on April 4, 2014 and discussed Yelp’s stock 
drop on April 3, as opposed to the April 2 stock drop which is at issue here.  Id. 
8
 Based on the FTC letter referenced in the WSJ article, it appears as if the FTC included copies of 
the FTC complaints in its response to the WSJ’s FOIA request, but it is unclear whether the FTC 
made these complaints publicly available at the same time.  FAC ¶ 71 n. 25. 
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Moreover, it is unclear when the FTC made the disclosure.  As Defendant’s note, “Plaintiffs 
concede that the FOIA response by the FTC was dated March 18—two weeks earlier than reported 
in the Wall Street Journal—and they have no facts to show when the underlying data was actually 
available on the FTC website.”  ECF No. 63 at 6 n.4.  As a result, the Court has no way of 
assessing the materiality of the FTC’s disclosure.  Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ 
materiality argument based on the timing of the stock decline and the event study. 
 Second, Plaintiffs argue that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Matrixx, plaintiffs 
need not meet “some undefined threshold” of consumer complaints in order to sufficiently allege 
materiality.  ECF No. 62 at 8.  The Court previously rejected this argument in its Order denying 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration.  ECF No. 54.  The Court 
continues to find that the holding in Matrixx is inapplicable here and therefore rejects Plaintiffs’ 
argument on the same grounds.   
 In Matrixx, the defendants had withheld, or failed to disclose, complaints by physicians 
and users claiming that defendants’ over-the-counter cold remedy caused anosmia.  131 S. Ct. at 
1324.  Although defendants were aware of these claims, they did not disclose the existence of the 
claims or the related litigation to investors.  Id. at 1315.  Defendants argued that this failure to 
disclose the existence of the complaints was not material because the volume of the complaints 
was not “statistically significant” and thus did not prove causation.  Id. at 1315.  The Supreme 
Court disagreed, noting “that medical professionals and regulators act on the basis of evidence of 
causation that is not statistically significant,” and therefore “it stands to reason that in certain cases 
reasonable investors would as well.”  Id. at 1321.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that while 
“the mere existence of reports of adverse events . . . will not satisfy” the “total mix” materiality 
standard, the reports need not be statistically significant to support a finding of materiality.  Id.  
Rather, “the source, content, and context of the reports . . . may reveal in some cases that 
reasonable investors would have viewed reports of adverse events as material . . . .”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, by contrast, Defendants did not conceal the existence of the FTC complaints.  Yelp 
acknowledged in its Registration Statement that “[n]egative publicity could adversely affect our 
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reputation and brand,” specifically noting previous media reports of allegations that Yelp 
“manipulates [] reviews, rankings and ratings in favor of our advertisers and against non-
advertisers,” ECF No. 35-1 at 16, and that “various businesses have sued us alleging that we 
manipulate Yelp reviews in order to coerce them and other businesses to pay for Yelp advertising . 
. . .”  Id. at 12.  As a result, the disclosure of the existence of the FTC complaints did not 
significantly alter the total mix of information available to reasonable investors.  Unlike the 
Matrixx defendants, Defendants here had already informed investors of the existence of such 
complaints and even of the pending litigation concerning the complaints. Because Matrixx 
involved a failure to disclose complaints altogether, 563 U.S. at 31, 34, not a defendant’s 
acknowledgement of the existence of customer complaints coupled with a denial of the 
complaints’ veracity, that case is inapposite. 
 Third, Plaintiffs argue that Yelp’s denial of manipulation was material because allegations 
of review manipulation threatened “Yelp’s entire business model.”  ECF No. 62 at 9 (citing FAC ¶ 
87).  Plaintiffs allege that “Yelp is a one-product company” with substantially all of its revenue 
generated by the sale of its advertising products.  FAC ¶ 87(a).  Plaintiffs further allege that the 
credibility and integrity of reviews hosted by Yelp “was the entirety of the Company’s value 
proposition.”  Id. ¶ 87(c).  Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the Yelp’s denial of manipulation was 
material because “if a growing number of local businesses came to believe there was some 
relationship between reviews and advertising, Yelp’s advertising revenue and growth could be 
compromised.”  ECF No. 62 at 9.  These allegations do suggest that new information regarding 
Yelp’s alleged manipulation could have a significant impact on Yelp’s profitability and thus 
Yelp’s stock price.  However, these allegations do nothing to address a flaw that the Court 
previously relied on in rejecting Plaintiffs’ materiality argument:  the fact that some businesses 
made allegations that Yelp manipulated reviews was disclosed by Yelp before the beginning of the 
class period in Yelp’s Registration Statement.  ECF No. 48 at 16.  For that reason, the Court 
continues to find that the FTC complaints regarding manipulation did not alter the “total mix” of 
information available to the marketplace on the issue of whether Yelp manipulates reviews of 
businesses in connection with advertising.   
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iii. Forecasted Growth 
Third, Plaintiffs allege that Yelp’s statements regarding future business prospects were 
false or misleading because “strong performance and raised financial guidance” was not “driven 
by . . . authentic, firsthand content,” as Yelp claimed.  FAC ¶ 49.  Plaintiffs suggest that 
Defendants failed to disclose that Yelp’s future revenue in fact relied upon the alleged advertising 
practices.   
As the Court previously noted, ECF No. 48 at 17, optimistic statements about a company’s 
prospects can be actionable “if not genuinely and reasonably believed, or if the speaker is aware of 
undisclosed facts that tend seriously to undermine the statement’s accuracy.”  Cooper v. Pickett, 
137 F.3d 616, 629 (9th Cir. 1997).  Short of such awareness, these statements generally are not 
actionable, as “[t]he statement, ‘the storm is passing and it will be sunny tomorrow,’ when it in 
fact continues to snow the next day, may be bad forecasting, but it is not necessarily a lie.”  
Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 433 (9th Cir. 2001).  Because the FAC, like the initial 
Complaint, does not establish that Defendants made false statements related to the manipulation of 
reviews in favor of advertisers and against non-advertisers, Plaintiffs have not pleaded with 
particularity that Defendants’ optimistic statements about the company’s prospects was 
undermined by undisclosed facts that Defendants’ knew. 
Accordingly, the Court continues to hold that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege 
that any of Defendants’ statements were materially false. 
B. Loss Causation 
 Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ allegedly false statements caused Yelp’s stock to rise 
artificially.  FAC ¶ 88.  Plaintiffs further allege that on April 2, 2014, “The Wall Street Journal 
article revealed to the market the scope and magnitude of [Yelp’s] practices, previously denied by 
[Yelp], and, as a result, its stock price quickly declined.  In fact, following The Wall Street Journal 
article, Yelp’s stock price declined 5.7%, compared to an increase in both the market and industry 
indices.”  FAC ¶ 90. 
 “To prove loss causation, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate a causal connection between the 
deceptive acts that form the basis for the claim of securities fraud and the injury suffered by the 
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Plaintiffs.”  Oregon Pub. Employees Ret. Fund, 774 F.3d at 608 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Securities plaintiffs need not prove that a defendant’s representations were fraudulent to 
sufficiently plead loss causation.  See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 
1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008).  However, “that does not allow a plaintiff to plead loss causation 
through ‘euphemism’ and thereby avoid alleging the necessary connection between defendant’s 
fraud and the actual loss.”  Id.  Indeed, information that reveals a mere “risk” or “potential” for 
fraud is insufficient to establish loss causation.  Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d 880, 889 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
 In its April 2015 Order, the Court found that because “the FTC complaints [referenced in 
the WSJ article] do not establish the falsity of Defendants’ representations, . . . the release of the 
FTC complaints did not reveal any fraudulent practices to the market.”  ECF No. 48 at 17.  The 
Court went on to hold that the decline in Yelp’s stock on April 2, 2014 could only be attributed to 
“market speculation about whether fraud had occurred,” which “simply cannot form the basis of a 
viable loss causation theory.”  ECF No. 48 at 19 (quoting Loos, 762 F.3d at 890).   
 In the FAC, Plaintiffs seek to remedy their loss causation theory by proffering the 
aforementioned event study, which purports to show the statistical significance of Yelp’s stock 
drop on April 2, 2014.  FAC ¶¶ 89–90.  Defendants respond that the event study is inapposite 
because it does not establish that any of the information revealed in the WSJ article or the FTC 
disclosures was new––meaning that no “fraud was revealed to the market,” Loos, 762 F.3d at 887 
(emphasis added).  ECF No. 59 at 11.  Defendants’ assert that the disclosures instead only 
revealed the potential of fraud, which is insufficient to plead loss causation under Loos.  ECF No. 
63 at 9 (citing Loos, 762 F.3d at 890). Finally, Defendants assert that because the WSJ article did 
not discuss the content of the FTC complaints, Plaintiffs have not pleaded with particularity that 
the relevant FTC complaints caused Yelp’s stock price to drop.  ECF No. 59 at 12 (citing ECF No. 
55-3, Exhibit 7 (April 2, 2014 WSJ article) and quoting ECF No. 55-3, Exhibit 8 (April 2, 2014 
The Street article) (“The exact nature of the complaints are unknown . . . .”) and Exhibit 9 (April 
3, 2014 SunTrust Robinson Humphrey report) (“The complaints have not necessarily been verified 
by the FTC and we do not know the exact nature or detail of the complaints”)). 
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 The Court continues to find that the FTC disclosures did not reveal any fraud to the market 
because the disclosures did not establish that Defendants’ statements were false or misleading.  
Instead, like the impending investigation in Loos, the market merely became aware of the 
possibility that further investigations by the FTC could later establish that Defendants’ denials 
were false or misleading.  ECF No. 48 at 19 (citing Loos, 762 F.3d at 890).  Plaintiffs have added 
no allegations in the FAC that would counsel otherwise. 
 While Defendants’ event study suggests that the stock drop on April 2, 2014 was 
“statistically significant”—i.e., the stock drop was not the “result of random error”9 or 
happenstance— it cannot identify to what information the market reacted on April 2, 2014.  As 
discussed supra Part III.A.ii.b, the April 2, 2014 stock drop could not have been caused by the 
WSJ article itself because that article was published after Yelp’s stock had already dropped.  
Instead, the April 2, 2014 stock drop may have been caused by the FTC disclosure of the 
complaints reported on in the WSJ article.  However, the FAC does not plead any facts regarding 
the FTC’s disclosure of these complaints.  In particular, the FAC does not allege when the FTC 
disclosure occurred.  Moreover, the FAC does not allege whether the FTC disclosure included the 
contents of the complaints or whether the FTC disclosure merely indicated the number of 
complaints.  Indeed, the market may have reacted to the sheer number of complaints reported by 
the FTC, which would not support Plaintiffs’ loss causation theory because Plaintiffs must plead a 
causal connection “between the deceptive acts that form the basis for the claim of securities fraud 
and the injury suffered by the Plaintiffs.”  Oregon Pub. Employees Ret. Fund, 774 F.3d at 608 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Without more information, Plaintiffs’ contention that the market reacted to the statements 
at issue here “is not a fact.  It is an inference [Plaintiffs] believe is warranted from the facts that 
are alleged.”  Metzler, 540 F.3d at 1065.  The Court finds this inference unwarranted at this stage 
because Plaintiffs have not pleaded any facts relating to the FTC disclosure itself. 
C. Scienter 
                                                 
9
 Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 1319 n.6 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence 354 (2d ed. 2000)). 
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 The PSLRA’s heightened scienter standard requires that plaintiffs “state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  15 
U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A).  The required state of mind is a “mental state embracing intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n. 12 (1976).  
“[R]ecklessness may satisfy the element of scienter in a civil action for damages under §10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.”  Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp, 914 F.2d 1564, 1568–69 (9th Cir. 1990).  Reckless 
conduct, in this context, “may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely 
simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary 
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the 
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.”  Id. at 1569 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Because scienter is a subjective inquiry, “the ultimate question is 
whether the defendant knew his or her statements were false, or was consciously reckless as to 
their truth or falsity.”  Gebhart v. SEC, 595 F.3d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 The “strong inference” of scienter required by the PSLRA “need not be irrefutable, i.e., of 
the ‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the most plausible of competing inferences.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It 
must, however, “be more than merely ‘reasonable’ or ‘permissible’—it must be cogent and 
compelling, thus strong in light of other explanations.”  Id.  “A court must compare the malicious 
and innocent inferences cognizable from the facts pled in the complaint, and only allow the 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss if the malicious inference is at least as compelling as any 
opposing innocent inference.”  Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 991 (9th 
Cir. 2009).  Courts, however, cannot conduct this analysis “in a vacuum.”  Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. 
at 323.  To evaluate whether a complaint satisfies the “strong inference” requirement, courts must 
consider “all of the facts alleged, taken collectively,” not “scrutinized in isolation.”  In re 
VeriFone Holdings, 704 F.3d at 701 (emphasis in original).  
i. Allegations Regarding Defendants’ Role in the Company 
 First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ scienter can be inferred from their “position of 
control and authority as officers and/or directors” of Yelp and their resulting “access to the 
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adverse undisclosed information about [Yelp]’s financial condition and performance as 
particularized [in the FAC].”  FAC ¶ 30–31; ECF No. 62 at 21.  Plaintiffs argue that “[l]ocal 
advertising services (i.e. the monetization of reviews) were ‘core’ to Yelp’s success, adding 
circumstantial evidence of defendants’ scienter.  ECF No. 62 at 22.  Defendants characterize these 
claims as the same conclusory statements about Defendants’ role in Yelp that the Court previously 
rejected.  ECF No. 59 at 14.   
 “As a general matter, corporate management’s general awareness of the day-to-day 
workings of the company’s business does not establish scienter—at least absent some additional 
allegation of specific information conveyed to management and related to the fraud or other 
allegations supporting scienter.”  S. Ferry, 542 F.3d at 784–85 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Under the “core operations inference,” however, “allegations regarding 
management’s role in a company . . . may conceivably satisfy the PSLRA standard . . . without 
accompanying particularized allegations, in rare circumstances where the nature of the relevant 
fact is of such prominence that it would be ‘absurd’ to suggest that management was without 
knowledge of the matter.”  Id. at 786.  
 In its April 2015 Order, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ scienter argument based on 
management’s general awareness of the day-to-day workings of Yelp because “Defendants never 
indicated that they were personally involved in ensuring the authenticity of Yelp’s reviews” and 
therefore it was not “absurd to suggest” that Defendants did not have knowledge of Yelp’s 
representatives’ alleged advertising tactics.  ECF No. 48 at 21–22.   
 Plaintiffs do little to cure this defect in the FAC.  Plaintiffs suggest that because Yelp had 
the ability to manually filter reviews and employed community managers, scouts, and 
ambassadors to curate, write, and edit reviews, Yelp executives necessarily had “knowledge and 
control over Yelp’s content and had access to information contradicting their public statements.”  
ECF No. 62 at 21.  Defendants counter that statements referring to Yelp’s curating, filtering, and 
creating reviews is irrelevant because nothing “in the FAC and nothing in the Opposition comes 
remotely close to showing” that Defendants knew about the alleged manipulation of reviews and 
made “a conscious decision to lie about it.”  ECF No. 63 at 12.   
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 The Court agrees that the FAC does not include any “allegation[s] of specific information 
conveyed to management that is related to the fraud.”  S. Ferry, 542 F.3d at 785.  Defendants’ 
statements that “we employ proprietary filtering technology to analyze and screen all of our 
reviews” does not imply, by any measure, that Yelp’s directors and officers personally screened 
reviews or knew about the alleged illicit advertising scheme.  FAC ¶ 43.  If anything, this 
statement indicates that the majority of Yelp’s monitoring is done automatically and without 
human intervention.  The fact that Yelp employed community managers, scouts, and ambassadors 
to write and curate posts also does not indicate that Yelp’s directors and officers knew that any 
significant number of reviews were not authentic or firsthand, beyond what Defendants 
represented to the public.  As the Court stated in the April 2015 Order, it is not “self-evident that 
Yelp’s chief executives necessarily knew of the veracity of complaints made by individual local 
business owners who contacted Yelp and offered evidence that reviews or their business were not 
credible or were being manipulated by Yelp employees because they had declined to advertise.”  
ECF No. 48 at 21.  Nor is it “absurd” to suggest that Defendants were unaware of the truth of the 
allegations that Yelp employees were manipulating reviews.  ECF No. 48 at 22.   
ii. Allegations Regarding Unusual Insider Sales 
 Second, Plaintiffs rely on Defendants’ stock sales during the class period as circumstantial 
evidence that Defendants knew Yelp’s stock price was artificially inflated.  FAC ¶¶ 66–68.  To 
establish a sufficiently “strong inference” of scienter based on circumstantial evidence of insider 
trading, the Ninth Circuit requires plaintiffs to allege “unusual” or “suspicious” stock sales 
“dramatically out of line with prior trading practices at times calculated to maximize the personal 
benefit from undisclosed inside information.”  Ronconi, 253 F.3d at 435 (emphasis and internal 
quotations marks omitted).  To assess whether insider sales qualify as unusual or suspicious, 
courts consider “(1) the amount and percentage of shares sold by insiders; (2) the timing of the 
sales; and (3) whether the sales were consistent with the insider’s prior trading history.”  Id.  
Plaintiffs “must allege sufficient context of insider trading for [courts] to determine whether the 
level of trading is dramatically out of line with prior trading practices.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
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 In its April 2015 Order, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument based on insider sales 
because Plaintiffs had not “provided any context for the sales described in the Complaint and the 
Court thus [could not] conclude that the sales were suspicious.”  ECF No. 48 at 22.  In particular, 
the Court noted that it had “no basis on which to conclude that there exists a strong inference that 
these sales were out of line with prior trading practices because the Complaint does not allege any 
information regarding the insider’s prior trading practices.”  Id. at 23 
  In the FAC, Plaintiffs have added the percentages of overall Class A and Class A+B
10
 
shares sold by eight Yelp insiders during the Class Period.  FAC ¶ 66.  Plaintiffs have also 
included stock market journalists’ impressions of these insider sales, including characterizations 
that insider selling at Yelp was “rampant” during the Class Period.  FAC ¶ 67.   
 Defendants respond that “the FAC again fails to provide any prior context for the sales 
made during the class period.”  ECF No. 59 at 13.  Defendants note that the only difference 
between the initial Complaint and the FAC is that the FAC adds “the percentage of Class A 
common stock allegedly sold by certain insiders.”  Id. at 14.  Lastly, Defendants contend that the 
sales “were consistent with prior patterns and, in most of the material cases, the result of 10b5-1 
stock sales plans.”  Id. at 13.   
 The Court cannot discern the relevance of the percentage of Class A common stock sales 
during the Class Period because those shares comprise a minority of Defendants’ overall Yelp 
stock holdings.
11
  FAC ¶ 66.  Plaintiffs have provided no authority––and the Court is aware of 
none––that supports the claim that a high percentage of sales of one class of stock supports a 
finding of scienter where those shares represent a small overall percentage of the seller’s total 
stock holdings.
12
  Indeed, Plaintiffs appear to agree that “sales of all holdings should be taken into 
                                                 
10
 The primary difference between “Class A” and “Class B” common stock is that “the holders of 
Class A common stock are entitled to one vote per share while the holders of Class B common 
stock are entitled to 10 votes per share.”  FAC ¶ 66 n. 23. 
11
 For example, between November 4, 2013 and March 10, 2014, Plaintiffs allege Defendant 
Stoppelman sold 50% of his Class A shares––a figure that merely comprises 2.1% of his overall 
Class A+B holdings.  FAC ¶ 66.   
12
 Plaintiffs suggest that sales of Class A shares uniquely show scienter because they “were the 
shares available to insiders for sale without substantially diluting their voting power, making 
defendants more likely to unload them.”  ECF No. 62 at 23.  However, the fact that Defendants 
were incentivized to sell their Class A shares first while maintaining their Class B shares does not 
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account when determining scienter.”  ECF No. 62 at 23.  However, the overall percentages of 
Class A+B shares sold by Defendants do not support an inference of scienter.  FAC ¶ 66 (listing 
insider sales of 9.1%, 22.76%, and 2.1% for the named Defendants); Ronconi, 253 F.3d at 435 
(finding insider sales of 10% and 17% not “suspicious”). 
 More importantly, however, Plaintiffs have once again failed to provide any historical 
context for the insider sales, leaving the Court unable to determine if the sales were, in fact, 
suspicious.  FAC ¶ 66; ECF No. 48 at 22–23.  Plaintiffs once again argue that the Court should 
ignore this deficiency because Yelp’s initial public offering occurred in March 2012, and thus, 
Plaintiffs do not have enough historical data to show that the insides sales are “unusual” or 
“suspicious.”  ECF No. 62 at 24 (citing Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F.Supp.2d 827, 841 (N.D. Ill. 
2000)).
13
  However, it is Plaintiffs’ burden to plead scienter with particularity should they wish to 
pursue a securities claim against Defendants.  Plaintiffs may allege scienter in any number of 
ways, and thus the unavailability of historical trading data does not unfairly foreclose Plaintiffs’ 
ability to survive a motion to dismiss.  In the Ninth Circuit, information about trading history 
remains “necessary to determine whether the sales during the Class Period were out of line with 
historical practices,”  Police Ret. System of St. Louis v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 759 F.3d 1051, 
1064 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Because Plaintiffs have submitted no 
such historical trading data, the Court cannot conclude that the insider sales alleged by Plaintiffs 
supports a finding of scienter. 
 Considering both of Plaintiffs’ scienter theories collectively, the Court concludes that 
Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of alleging scienter under the pleading requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) and the PSLRA.
14
 
                                                                                                                                                                
support a finding of scienter.  Rather, Defendants simply appear to have decided to sell their less 
valuable shares first. 
13
 Plaintiffs’ reliance on the reasoning in Chu is unavailing.  In Chu, the court did not hold that a 
plaintiff’s burden of pleading scienter is eased when it lacks historical stock price data.  The court 
merely noted that when prior trading history is unavailable, plaintiffs cannot use past trading to 
support their scienter theory.  Chu, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 841.  Ultimately, the Chu court examined 
the “level and timing of sales” and held that the plaintiffs had inadequately alleged scienter against 
the defendants, despite the fact that some defendants had sold a majority of their holdings during 
the class period.  Id. at 842. 
14
 Because Plaintiffs have done nothing to cure the deficiencies of scienter in their initial 
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D. Plaintiffs’ Derivative Section 20(a) Claim 
 Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which forms the basis of Plaintiffs’ second 
cause of action, extends liability to persons who directly or indirectly control a violator of the 
securities laws.  15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).  A claim under section 20(a) can only survive if the 
underlying predicate Securities Exchange Act violation also survives.  See Howard v. Everex Sys., 
Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000).  Because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ predicate 
Securities Exchange Act claim, Plaintiffs’ second cause of action also must be dismissed. 
IV. Leave to Amend 
 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s initial Complaint without prejudice and directed 
Plaintiffs to add to any amended complaint additional factual allegations demonstrating material 
falsity, loss causation, and scienter.  ECF No. 48 at 24.  The fact that Plaintiffs “failed to correct 
these deficiencies in [their First] Amended Complaint is a strong indication that the plaintiffs have 
no additional facts to plead.”  Zucco Partners, LLC, 552 F.3d at 1007 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “A district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad where the 
plaintiff has previously amended.”  Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court concludes that further leave to amend would 
be futile and therefore dismisses Plaintiffs’ FAC without leave to amend.   
V. Conclusion 
Plaintiffs have failed to plead with particularity materially false or misleading statements, 
loss causation, and scienter.  Plaintiffs have therefore not stated a claim for relief under either  
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
                                                                                                                                                                
Complaint, the Court need not consider Defendants’ argument based on the named Defendants’ 
10b5-1 stock sales plans.  ECF No. 59 at 13–14. 
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section 10(b) or 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.  Accordingly, the Court hereby dismisses 
the FAC without leave to amend. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated:  November 24, 2015 
 
 
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 
 
